University of Colorado Law School

Colorado Law Scholarly Commons
Articles

Colorado Law Faculty Scholarship

2014

Setting the Tipping Point for Disclosing the Identity of Anonymous
Online Speakers: Lessons from Other Disclosure Contexts
Helen Norton
University of Colorado Law School

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.law.colorado.edu/faculty-articles
Part of the Evidence Commons, First Amendment Commons, and the Internet Law Commons

Citation Information
Helen Norton, Setting the Tipping Point for Disclosing the Identity of Anonymous Online Speakers:
Lessons from Other Disclosure Contexts, 49 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 565 (2014), available at
https://scholar.law.colorado.edu/faculty-articles/84.

Copyright Statement

Copyright protected. Use of materials from this collection beyond the exceptions provided for in the Fair Use and
Educational Use clauses of the U.S. Copyright Law may violate federal law. Permission to publish or reproduce is
required.
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Colorado Law Faculty Scholarship at Colorado Law
Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Articles by an authorized administrator of Colorado Law
Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact lauren.seney@colorado.edu.

+(,121/,1(
Citation: 49 Wake Forest L. Rev. 565 2014
Provided by:
William A. Wise Law Library

Content downloaded/printed from HeinOnline
Fri Feb 24 10:51:10 2017
-- Your use of this HeinOnline PDF indicates your acceptance
of HeinOnline's Terms and Conditions of the license
agreement available at http://heinonline.org/HOL/License
-- The search text of this PDF is generated from
uncorrected OCR text.
-- To obtain permission to use this article beyond the scope
of your HeinOnline license, please use:
Copyright Information

SETTING THE TIPPING POINT FOR DISCLOSING
THE IDENTITY OF ANONYMOUS ONLINE SPEAKERS:
LESSONS FROM OTHER DISCLOSURE CONTEXTS
Helen Norton*

INTRODUCTION

Anonymous speech can have great First Amendment value.,
But anonymous speech-and perhaps especially anonymous online
speech-can sometimes inflict substantial harm, as is the case, for
2
example, with defamation, threats, and copyright infringement.
For this reason, First Amendment protections for anonymous speech
3
are far from absolute.
Under what conditions should courts thus require anonymous
online speakers alleged to have engaged in defamatory, threatening,
or other unprotected and illegal speech to disclose their identities?
Disclosing-or "unmasking"-the identity of an online speaker who
seeks to speak anonymously to protect herself from unjust reprisal
can undermine important First Amendment values, but unmasking
* Associate Dean for Academic

Affairs

and Associate Professor,

University of Colorado School of Law. Many thanks to the Wake Forest Law
Review for hosting and managing this symposium, to Alex Tsesis for inspiring
it, to John Lauer for helpful research assistance, and to Bryan Choi for
thoughtful comments.
1. See, e.g., McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334, 341-42
(1995) (describing a range of circumstances in which anonymous speech has
First Amendment value); Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky, Silencing John Doe:
Defamation & Discourse in Cyberspace, 49 DUKE L.J. 855, 892-98 (2009).
2. See, e.g., Bryan H. Choi, The Anonymous Internet, 72 MD. L. REV. 501,
539-40 (2013) ('"When anonymity allows perpetrators to escape detection,
harms go unredressed and the aggregate incidence of harmful behavior
increases."); Lidsky, supra note 1, at 884-85 ("If John Doe is unscrupulous or
merely reckless, however, he can use the power the Internet gives him to inflict
serious harm on the corporation. He can pollute the information stream with
defamatory falsehoods, which may in turn influence other investors to question
the corporation's credibility or financial health. Moreover, once the defamatory
information enters the information stream, it may have a greater impact than if
it had appeared in print. Because the defamatory statements can be copied and
posted in other Internet discussion fora, both the potential audience and the
subsequent potential for harm are magnified. And, as the persistence of
Internet hoaxes demonstrates, once a rumor takes hold in cyberspace, it may be
almost impossible to root out.").
3. See Choi, supra note 2, at 542-51 (observing that the Court's case law
rejects the notion of a generalized right to anonymity).
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an anonymous online speaker who seeks instead to avoid legal
accountability for her unprotected (and illegal) speech does not.4 To
date, courts have struggled with a wide variety of tests that seek to
determine the point-I will call this the tipping point-at which
they become sufficiently confident that disclosure's accountability
gains justify the unmasking of an anonymous online speaker.
This Essay takes an intradisciplinary approach to this problem
by examining parallel disclosure challenges in other First
Amendment contexts, exploring how lessons learned in those
debates might inform courts' approaches to identifying the
appropriate legal trigger for unmasking anonymous online speakers
alleged by private plaintiffs to have engaged in illegal (and
unprotected) speech. As we shall see, courts considering other
disclosure challenges often screen for any impermissible government
motive in seeking disclosure and then balance the disclosure's
informational or other benefits against any deterrent effects on
Together, these two analyses appropriately
protected speech.
recognize that the government often-but not always-has good
reason for seeking disclosure and also that different disclosure
requirements may vary considerably in their potential chilling
effects on protected expression.
This Essay then explores how these analyses might inform the
search for an appropriate unmasking standard in the online setting.
It suggests that courts confronted with such challenges choose an
evidentiary standard that leaves them confident both that the
disclosure effort is appropriately motivated by an interest in
vindicating the plaintiffs' private law interests rather than in
censoring or targeting vulnerable speakers, and also that such
disclosure's accountability gains outweigh their potential chilling
effects. More specifically, this Essay concludes that courts might be
more suspicious of disclosure efforts sought by a government official
and correspondingly impose a tougher evidentiary standard, or
tipping point, on that plaintiff before requiring disclosure of the
defendant's identity.
Furthermore, courts might choose the
appropriate tipping point based on their assessment of the
disclosure's potential chilling effects, which may turn in great part
on the nature of the contested speech-for example, as commercial
or noncommercial, or of public or private concern.

4. Lyrissa Lidsky and Thomas Cotter thoughtfully distinguish between an
anonymous speaker's interest in avoiding what they call "wrongful" retaliation
(such as threats and harassment) from a speaker's interest in escaping
"justifiable" retaliation (such as legal accountability for actionable expression).
Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky & Thomas F. Cotter, Authorship, Audiences, and
Anonymous Speech, 82 NoTRE DAME L. REV. 1537, 1570-75 (2007).
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I. LESSONS FROM DISCLOSURE CHALLENGES IN OTHER CONTEXTS
A number of thoughtful commentators have explained that
courts considering disclosure challenges in other settings generally
assess the government's motive in seeking disclosure, balance the
disclosure's expressive costs against its benefits in achieving
important government interests, or both.5 Dale Ho, for example,
describes an "antisuppression" approach in which courts consider
social and historical context to determine whether the government
improperly seeks disclosure to target and censor controversial or
dissenting views. 6 He also describes a contrasting "antichilling"
approach in which courts instead consider whether governmental
disclosure requirements impose expressive costs (by deterring
protected speech) that outweigh their benefits in achieving
7
substantial government interests.
As Leslie Kendrick has observed, both approaches are often in
play. More specifically, she explains that a number of judicial
decisions that reject the government's efforts to force identity
disclosure can be understood as appropriately representing "a
categorical presumption against a certain form of government
purpose: where the government orders disclosure in order to
penalize or deter particular viewpoints."8 If the courts find that the
5. As Leslie Kendrick has observed, "disclosure law is about both
categorization and balancing, both purpose and effects." Leslie Kendrick,
Disclosure and its Discontents, 27 J.L. & POL. 575, 577 (2012); see also id. at 576
(explaining that she aims to "complicate" our understanding of disclosure
doctrine by suggesting that "a small but important set of disclosure cases is
actually about categorization and purpose, rather than balancing and effects,"
and second, that "although disclosure law is more about purpose and
categorization than generally recognized, it does not follow that the doctrine is
mistaken in focusing on effects and balancing").
6. Dale E. Ho, NAACP v. Alabama and False Symmetry in the Disclosure
Debate, 15 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POLY 405, 413-14 (2012).
7. Id. at 407; see also id. at 413 (weighing "the harm that a given speech
restriction has on a speaker's expressive activity against the interests asserted
by the state in maintaining its regulation").
8. Kendrick, supra note 5, at 583; accord id. at 581 ('If the government
could not criminalize the offending viewpoints directly, the corollary is that it
also could not penalize them through exposure. Here, the government action at
issue is not criminal, civil, or administrative penalty. Instead, it is disclosure or
threatened disclosure undertaken with the dual aims of exposing speakers to
shame and reprisals and employing that unwelcome prospect to deter their
protected expression. These aims indicate that the government's purpose is to
single out particular speakers for unfavorable treatment."); see also Elena

Kagan, Private Speech, Public Purpose: The Role of Governmental Motive in
First Amendment Doctrine, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 413, 414 (1996) (urging that First
Amendment doctrine in general can be understood as the courts' search for
impermissible government motive in regulating speech); id. at 425-26
(explaining that a motive-based approach to First Amendment analysis "claims
that what is essential is not the consequences of a regulation but the reasons
that underlie it. The point of attention is neither the speaker nor the audience,
but the governmental actor standing in the way of the communicative process.
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government's disclosure efforts are so impermissibly motivated, it
will reject the efforts.
Disclosures that are not motivated by an impermissible
government interest are generally still "analyzed for their effects on
expression, which will inevitably involve balancing interests."9 Such
a balancing approach 10 involves "weigh[ing] the harm that a given
speech restriction has on a speaker's expressive activity against the
interests asserted by the state in maintaining its regulation."'"
Together, these two approaches appropriately recognize that the
government often-but not always-has good reason for seeking
disclosure, and also that different disclosure requirements may vary
considerably in their potential chilling effects on protected

expression. 12
We can see both approaches at work in a number of disclosure
contests. Recall, for example, the Supreme Court's decision in
NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson.'3 There, the State of Alabama
sought to compel disclosure of the identities of all Alabama members
of the NAACP, ostensibly to enforce state law regulating foreign
corporations doing business within the state.' 4 But plenty of
evidence indicated that the government's disclosure efforts were
instead motivated by its intent to shut down its target's political

Under this model, an action may violate the First Amendment because its basis
is illegitimate, regardless of the effects of the action on either the sum of
expressive opportunities or the condition of public discourse. Conversely, an
action may comport with the First Amendment because legitimate reasons
underlie it, again regardless of its range of consequences. The critical inquiry
concerns what lies behind, rather than what proceeds from, an exercise of
governmental power").
9. Kendrick, supra note 5, at 596.
10. Kendrick explains that courts have always engaged in balancing when
considering disclosure requirements, even though they often claim to be
reluctant to do so elsewhere in First Amendment analyses. Id. at 576 ("[T]he
issue of disclosure presents a particularly strong challenge to the predominant,
dim view of effects- and balancing-tests."); id. at 587 ("Given that disclosure
may at once provide listeners (and would-be speakers) with useful information
and deter other would-be speakers (and thus deprive listeners of other
viewpoints), determining the effect of a law upon autonomy may require a type
of balancing.").
11. Ho, supra note 6, at 413.
12. Kendrick, supra note 5, at 586 ("There are enough legitimate reasons
for the government to legislate disclosure that it would be improper to draw an
inference of discrimination from the fact of a disclosure requirement. First,
information is necessary to governance, particularly so in a regulatory state.
The government may legitimately seek disclosures to ensure the functioning not
just of its campaign finance system but also of its securities laws, its
prescription drug approval process, and any number of other regulatory
undertakings.... Second, in contrast with most restrictions on speech,
compelled disclosure may itself serve First Amendment values.").
13. 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
14. Id. at 451.
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Indeed, historian Taylor Branch characterized the
activity. 15
purpose of the litigation led by Alabama Attorney General (and later
Governor) John Patterson as "to put the NAACP out of business-a
goal that Alabama successfully accomplished for a number of
16
years."
In addition to screening for impermissible government motive,
the Patterson decision also explicitly relied on balancing, as the
Court determined that the expressive costs of such disclosure in
chilling members' political speech and association greatly
outweighed the government's sketchy interest in enforcing its laws
regulating out-of-state corporations. 17 On one side of the scale, the
NAACP "ha[d] made an uncontroverted showing that on past
occasions revelation of the identity of its rank-and-file members
ha[d] exposed these members to economic reprisal, loss of
employment, threat of physical coercion, and other manifestations of
public hostility."'18 On the other, "whatever interest the State may
have [had] in obtaining names of ordinary members ha[d] not been
shown to be sufficient to overcome petitioner's constitutional
objections."'19 Pattersonthus involved a case in which the Court had
both good reason to suspect the government's motive in seeking
disclosure as well as strong evidence that the disclosure's expressive
costs outweighed its nominal law enforcement benefit. The Court
thus had more than ample grounds to reject the disclosure effort.
Switching to another context, the Court's campaign disclosure
doctrine similarly illustrates both motive-based and balancing
analysis at work. But campaign disclosure requirements often
survive those inquiries, as the Court has generally upheld statutes
requiring certain political speakers to disclose their identities-for
example, as the source of certain campaign contributions or
20
communications, or as petition signatories.

15. Ho, supra note 6, at 415 ("As the Supreme Court wryly observed in a
later decision, it was notable that the statute invoked by the state in this case
had never once been applied in any other instance to try to oust a corporation
from doing business in Alabama.").
16. See TAYLOR BRANCH, PARTING THE WATERS: AMERICA IN THE KING YEARS,
1954-63, at 222 (1988) (describing Alabama's efforts as the "pioneer action"
among "twenty-five separate lawsuits challenging [the NAACP's] right to
operate in the South, most of them filed by hostile states and municipalities").
17. Patterson,357 U.S. at 463-65.
18. Id. at 462; see also Ho, supra note 6, at 413 ("The plaintiffs, in other
words, faced more than mere criticism for their beliefs; they faced a choice
between self-expression and exposure to significant personal injury.").
19. Patterson, 357 U.S. at 465; see also id. at 463 ("We turn to the final
question whether Alabama has demonstrated an interest in obtaining the
disclosures it seeks from petitioner which is sufficient to justify the deterrent
effect which we have concluded these disclosures may well have.").
20. See Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 371 (2010) ("The First
Amendment protects political speech, and disclosure permits citizens and.
shareholders to react to the speech of corporate entities in a proper way. This
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First, we can understand the Court again to be screening for
impermissible government motive in seeking to disclose the identity
of campaign contributors and other campaign speakers-but here
finding none. 21 Unlike in Patterson, courts find little reason to
suspect the government's motive and often see good reason for such
disclosures, concluding that the government is permissibly
motivated by an interest in informing voters-an interest that itself
furthers First Amendment values by enhancing listeners' decisionmaking autonomy and informing their participation in democratic
22
self-governance.
Second, the Court's approach in the campaign disclosures
setting also relies heavily on balancing. 23 In general, the Court has
transparency enables the electorate to make informed decisions and give proper
weight to different speakers and messages."); Doe v. Reed, 130 S. Ct. 2811, 2819
(2010) (upholding disclosure requirements of the names of petition signatories
to achieve the government's interest in "preserving the integrity of the electoral
process by combating fraud, detecting invalid signatures, and fostering
government transparency and accountability"); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 67
(1976) ("[D]isclosure requirements deter actual corruption and avoid the
appearance of corruption by exposing large contributions and expenditures to
the light of publicity. This exposure may discourage those who would use
money for improper purposes either before or after the election. A public armed
with information about a candidate's most generous supporters is better able to
detect any post-election special favors that may be given in return."). But not
every campaign disclosure requirement survives the Court's scrutiny. See, e.g.,
Buckley v. Am. Const. Law Found., Inc., 525 U.S. 182, 199-200 (1999) (striking
down a state law requiring petition circulators to wear identifying badges as
imposing expressive costs that outweigh any informational benefit to listeners);
McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334, 355-57 (1995) (striking down
a state law requiring campaign leaflets to disclose their source).
21. Ho, supra note 6, at 408 (noting "fundamental differences between the
First Amendment harms inflicted by disclosure requirements as applied to
minority or dissident groups, and the costs exacted when such rules are applied
in most circumstances"); id. at 435 (concluding that the campaign disclosure
doctrine is largely anti suppression in approach: '"Traditionally, we have
subjected more powerful speakers to disclosure requirements, while at the same
time exempting relatively powerless speakers from such requirements in order
to shield them from reprisals").
22. For a discussion of the values most often identified as underlying the
First Amendment, see, e.g., ROBERT C. POST, DEMOCRACY, EXPERTISE, ACADEMIC
FREEDOM: A FIRST AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE FOR THE MODERN STATE 6 (2012)
(summarizing and describing the three major proposed purposes of the First
Amendment as "cognitive" (advancing knowledge and discovering truth);
"ethical" (furthering individual autonomy and self-fulfillment); and "political"
("facilitating the communicative processes necessary for successful democratic
self-governance")); Thomas I. Emerson, First Amendment Doctrine and the
Burger Court, 68 CALIF. L. REV. 422, 423 (1980); Frederick Schauer, The
Boundaries of the First Amendment: A Preliminary Exploration of
ConstitutionalSalience, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1765, 1786 (2004).
23. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 68 ('"These are not insignificant burdens on
individual rights, and they must be weighed carefully against the interests
which Congress has sought to promote by this legislation."); id. at 66 ("The
strict test established by NAACP v. Alabama is necessary because compelled
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made a default balancing judgment that campaign disclosures'
substantial informational benefits to voters outweigh their
comparatively limited deterrent effects on speech. 24 But because the
Court also recognizes the possibility that some speakers-like 1950s
Alabama NAACP members-may have unusually good reasons to
resist disclosure, it has created an exception that permits speakers
to rebut this default balancing judgment that campaign disclosures'
informational gains outweigh their expressive costs when they can
prove "a reasonable probability that the compelled disclosure
will ... subject them to threats, harassment, or reprisals from either
Government officials or private parties." 25 The Court has insisted,

however, that such speakers prove, rather than simply claim, the
likelihood of such retaliation. 26 For these reasons, the Court has
generally upheld the government's campaign disclosure efforts.
Courts generally apply even more relaxed standards of scrutiny
to factual disclosure requirements in the commercial speech

disclosure has the potential for substantially infringing the exercise of First
Amendment rights. But we have acknowledged that there are governmental
interests
sufficiently
important
to
outweigh
the
possibility
of
infringement ....); id. at 72 ("On this record, the substantial public interest in
disclosure identified by the legislative history of this Act outweighs the harm
generally alleged."); Richard Briffault, Two Challenges for Campaign Finance
DisclosureAfter Citizens United and Doe v. Reed, 19 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J.
983, 991-92 (2011) (discussing the Court's "balancing of informational gains
against threats to political participation"). The Court has thus created a
rebuttable presumption that favors disclosure over anonymity in the context of
campaign speech statutes. Id. at 999. The baseline presumption in the online
unmasking context, in contrast, to date disfavors disclosure unless and until the
private party seeking disclosure meets the requisite evidentiary standard. See
infra Part II. The difference between the two defaults may be explained in part
by judicial deference to legislative judgments in electoral matters on the one
hand and the judicial tradition of requiring litigation plaintiffs to bear the
burden of proof on the other.
24. Reed, 130 S. Ct. at 2819 (upholding disclosure requirements of petition
signatories to achieve the government's interest in "preserving the integrity of
the electoral process by combating fraud, detecting invalid signatures, and
fostering government transparency and accountability"); Citizens United, 558
U.S. at 371 ("The First Amendment protects political speech, and disclosure
permits citizens and shareholders to react to the speech of corporate entities in
a proper way. This transparency enables the electorate to make informed
decisions and give proper weight to different speakers and messages."); Buckley,
424 U.S. at 67 ("[D]isclosure requirements deter actual corruption and avoid the
appearance of corruption by exposing large contributions and expenditures to
the light of publicity. This exposure may discourage those who would use
money for improper purposes either before or after the election. A public armed
with information about a candidate's most generous supporters is better able to
detect any post-election special favors that may be given in return.").
25. Reed, 130 S.Ct. at 2820 (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 74).
26. E.g., Doe v. Reed, 823 F. Supp. 2d 1195, 1212 (W.D. Wash. 2011)
(finding on remand that the plaintiffs who resisted disclosure of petition
signatories had failed to show reasonable probability of threats or harassment).
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context.27 There, the Supreme Court has held commercial speech to
be of comparatively less First Amendment value than the political
speech addressed above, and therefore subject to greater
regulation. 28 The Court has thus applied rational basis scrutiny in
upholding disclosure requirements that "are reasonably related to
the State's interest in preventing deception of consumers." 29 Courts
also often uphold statutes requiring commercial speakers to make
factual disclosures to inform listeners' decision making even absent
deception concerns. 30 Here too we can see assessments of motive

27. These disclosures often concern matters other than a speaker's identity,
but all involve contested disclosures of objectively verifiable facts-like
identity-that the speaker would prefer not to disclose. See, e.g., Nat'l Elec.
Mfrs. Ass'n v. Sorrell, 272 F.3d 104, 107 (2d Cir. 2001) (involving a challenge to
a statute that required manufacturers to inform consumers of the mercury
content of certain products).
28. The Court has held that commercial speech that is false, misleading, or
related to an illegal activity is entitled to no constitutional protection and thus
can be banned altogether. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv.
Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 562-64 (1980). In contrast, the Court applies
intermediate scrutiny to laws regulating other types of commercial speech
based on its conclusion that such speech-although still of comparatively low
value-can helpfully inform individuals about their choices in the commercial
realm. Id.; see also Ellen P. Goodman, Visual Gut Punch:Persuasion,Emotion,
and the Constitutional Meaning of Graphic Disclosure, 99 CORNELL L. REV.
(forthcoming 2014) (manuscript at 5-6), available at http://papers.ssrn.com
/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=2309133 ("[An] emphasis on the informational
interests of listeners, as distinct from the liberty of speakers, provides the
distinctive rationale for commercial speech protection. ... All this changes for
commercial speech because, here, the theory of First Amendment protection is
not freedom of mind, but freedom of information flow.").
29. Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v. United States, 559 U.S. 229, 250,
252-53 (2010) (upholding a federal statute requiring bankruptcy professionals
to include certain disclosures in their advertisements "to combat the problem of
inherently misleading commercial advertisements-specifically, the promise of
debt relief without any reference to the possibility of filing for bankruptcy,
which has inherent costs"); Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of the
Supreme Court of Ohio, 471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985) (holding that disclosure
requirements that are reasonably related to the State's interest in preventing
consumer deception do not violate commercial speakers' First Amendment
rights).
30. See Robert Post, Transparent and Efficient Markets: Compelled
Commercial Speech and Coerced Commercial Association in United Foods,
Zauderer, and Abood, 40 VAL. U. L. REV. 555, 584 (2006) ("[Cjommercial speech
is routinely and pervasively compelled for reasons that have little to do with the
prevention of deception.
The Federal Trade Commission now imposes
mandatory disclosure rules on a wide range of industries, requiring sellers to
divulge such information as 'the durability of light bulbs, octane ratings for
gasoline, tar and nicotine content of cigarettes, mileage per gallon for
automobiles, or care labeling of textile wearing apparel.' Congress has passed
innumerable statutes that contain analogous disclosure requirements. These
disclosure requirements force commercial speakers to engage in commercial
speech, but they do not do so merely to prevent potential consumer deception.
They primarily seek to reduce information costs and thereby to establish a more
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and balancing at work. Courts generally find little reason to suspect
the government's motive in this setting 31 because of the strong
informational value of the matters required to be disclosedinformation that itself furthers listeners' First Amendment
Moreover, courts' implicit balancing assessment
interests. 32
suggests that such disclosures pose little danger of chilling
commercial speakers who retain strong economic incentives to
speak.33 Indeed, the Court's commercial speech doctrine rests in
34
part on the "hardiness" of commercial speech.

educated and efficient marketplace." (quoting Robert Pitofsky, Beyond Nader:
Consumer Protection and the Regulation of Advertising, 90 HARV. L. REV. 661,
664 (1977))). Courts have not yet settled on rational basis or intermediate
scrutiny as the appropriate level of review to apply to disclosure requirements
intended to inform listeners, absent a history of deception by regulated
commercial speakers. See N.Y. State Rest. Ass'n v. N.Y.C. Bd. of Health, 556
F.3d 114, 133 (2d Cir. 2009) (discussing whether rational basis scrutiny or some
heightened level of review should apply to disclosure requirements designed to
inform consumer decision making in the absence of a finding of deception by the
regulated commercial speakers).
31. Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 652 n.14 ("Because the First Amendment
interests implicated by disclosure requirements are substantially weaker than
those at stake when speech is actually suppressed, we do not think it
appropriate to strike down such requirements merely because other possible
means by which the State might achieve its purposes can be hypothesized.
Similarly, we are unpersuaded by appellant's argument that a disclosure
requirement is subject to attack if it is 'under-inclusive'-that is, if it does not
get at all facets of the problem it is designed to ameliorate. As a general
matter, governments are entitled to attack problems piecemeal, save where
their policies implicate rights so fundamental that strict scrutiny must be
applied.").
32. Sorrell, 272 F.3d at 113-15 ("Commercial disclosure requirements are
treated differently from restrictions on commercial speech because mandated
disclosure of accurate, factual, commercial information does not offend the core
First Amendment values of promoting efficient exchange of information or
protecting individual liberty interests. Such disclosure furthers, rather than
hinders, the First Amendment goal of the discovery of truth and contributes to
the efficiency of the 'marketplace of ideas.' Protection of the robust and free flow
of accurate information is the principal First Amendment justification for
protecting commercial speech, and requiring disclosure of truthful information
promotes that goal. In such a case, then, less exacting scrutiny is required than
where truthful, nonmisleading commercial speech is restricted.").
33. Id. at 114 ("[T]he individual liberty interests guarded by the First
Amendment, which may be impaired when personal or political speech is
mandated by the state ... are not ordinarily implicated by compelled
commercial disclosure .... Required disclosure of accurate, factual commercial
information presents little risk that the state is forcing speakers to adopt
disagreeable state-sanctioned positions, suppressing dissent, confounding the
speaker's attempts to participate in self-governance, or interfering with an
individual's right to define and express his or her own personality." (citations
omitted)).
34. See Va. Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizen Consumer Council, Inc., 425
U.S. 748, 772 n.24 (1976) ("The truth of commercial speech, for example, may be
more easily verifiable by its disseminator than, let us say, news reporting or
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Disclosure doctrine outside of the online context can thus be
understood as involving an examination of the government's motive
in seeking disclosure of a speaker's identity and rejecting those
disclosures that are impermissibly motivated, followed by a
balancing of the disclosure's informational or public law
enforcement benefits against its expressive costs (if any) in
deterring protected speech. 35 The next Part explores how attention
to both motive and balancing may similarly help us think through
disclosure debates in the online setting, where courts struggle with
whether and when to require the unmasking of anonymous online
speakers alleged to have engaged in illegal (and unprotected)
speech.

II. APPLYING THESE LESSONS TO ONLINE DISCLOSURE DEBATES
Courts considering unmasking subpoenas in the online context
to date have generated a wide variety of possible tests while offering
little rationale for their preferred choice. The tests are similar in
that each requires the plaintiff to meet some threshold evidentiary
standard-again, I will call this the tipping point-that the
defendant's anonymous speech has violated tort, copyright, or some
political commentary, in that ordinarily the advertiser seeks to disseminate
information about a specific product or service that he himself provides and
presumably knows more about than anyone else. Also, commercial speech may
be more durable than other kinds. Since advertising is the sine qua non of
commercial profits, there is little likelihood of its being chilled by proper
regulation and forgone entirely.
Attributes such as these, the greater
objectivity and hardiness of commercial speech, may make it less necessary to
tolerate inaccurate statements for fear of silencing the speaker."). For an
argument that the same may be true of well-financed and highly motivated
political speakers, see Daniel Halberstam, Commercial Speech, Professional

Speech, and the Constitutional Status of Social Institutions, 147 U. PA. L. REV.
771, 797 (1999) (suggesting that those engaged in partisan political speech have
the same, very strong incentives to speak as those engaged in commercial
speech).
35. The Court has applied strict scrutiny to disclosures of certain facts
other than speaker identity outside of the commercial context. See, e.g., Riley v.
Nat'l Fed'n of the Blind of N.C., 487 U.S. 781, 795-96 (1988) (striking down a
state statute requiring fundraisers to disclose the percentage of funds actually
turned over to clients after concluding that the disclosure's significant burden
on noncommercial speakers outweighed the State's limited interests); see also
Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian, & Bisexual Grp. of Bos., Inc., 515 U.S. 557,
573-74 (1995) ("[O]utside [the context of commercial speech, the State] may not
compel affirmance of a belief with which the speaker disagrees.... [T]his
general rule ... applies not only to expressions of value, opinion, or
endorsement, but equally to statements of fact the speaker would rather
avoid."). But the government's requirement of certain factual disclosures
sometimes survives even strict scrutiny. See Riley, 487 U.S. at 799 n.11
("[N]othing in this opinion should be taken to suggest that the State may not
require a fundraiser to disclose unambiguously his or her professional status.
On the contrary, such a narrowly tailored requirement would withstand First
Amendment scrutiny.").
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other law. 36 The tests differ, however, in how much they demand of
the plaintiff. So far the alternatives range from requiring the
plaintiff to show that she has a "legitimate, good faith" basis for her
claim,3 7 to requiring that the plaintiff show that her claim can
survive a motion to dismiss, 38 to requiring the plaintiff to "make a
concrete showing as to each element of a prima facie case against
the defendant,"39 to requiring the plaintiff to show that her claim
could survive a motion for summary judgment on each of the
elements within the plaintiffs control. 40 Even after the plaintiff has
met the requisite evidentiary showing, some courts further require
an additional balancing analysis that weighs the defendant's
expressive interests against the plaintiffs need for disclosure to
vindicate private law rights. 41 Both the choice among the various
evidentiary standards 42 and the choice of whether 43to additionally
require another balancing element remain contested.

36. Note

that

courts

also

generally

impose

threshold

procedural

requirements upon the plaintiff, such as requiring that she undertake efforts to
notify the anonymous speaker-defendant that she is the subject of a disclosure
petition and to provide the speaker/defendant a reasonable opportunity to
oppose the petition. See, e.g., Doe v. Cahill, 884 A.2d 451, 460-61 (Del. 2005);
Dendrite Int'l, Inc. v. Doe, 775 A.2d 756, 760-61 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
2001); Matthew Mazzotta, Note, Balancing Act: Finding Consensus on
Standards for Unmasking Anonymous Internet Speakers, 51 B.C. L. REV. 833,
847 (2010) ("[A]lthough the language of different standards varies widely, there
is general agreement that plaintiffs seeking to unmask anonymous defendants
should first show that they have made reasonable attempts to provide
defendants with notice and an opportunity to respond to the unmasking
subpoena.").
37. E.g., Doe v. 2TheMart.com, Inc., 140 F. Supp. 2d 1088, 1095 (W.D.
Wash. 2001); In re Subpoena Duces Tecum to Am. Online, Inc., 52 Va. Cir. 26,
37 (Va. Cir. Ct. 2000), rev'd on other grounds, sub nom. Am. Online, Inc. v.
Anonymous Publicly Traded Co., 542 F.3d 377 (Va. 2001).
38. E.g., Columbia Ins. Co. v. Seescandy.com, 185 F.R.D. 573, 579 (N.D.
Cal. 1999).
39. Doe I v. Individuals, 561 F. Supp. 2d 249, 256 (D. Conn. 2008).
40. E.g., Cahill, 884 A.2d at 463. To be sure, courts often vary in their
descriptions of these various standards and to what extent they differ from each
other. See, e.g., In re Anonymous Online Speakers, 661 F.3d 1168, 1176 (9th
Cir. 2011) (characterizing Doe v. Cahill as adopting a prima facie rather than a
summary judgment standard).
41. E.g., DendriteInt'l, Inc., 775 A.2d at 760-61.
42. For a sampling of articles discussing the disagreement among courts
adopting these various standards, see Clay Calvert et al., David Doe v. Goliath,
Inc.: Judicial Ferment in 2009 for Business Plaintiffs Seeking the Identities of
Anonymous Online Speakers, 43 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 1, 15-29 (2009); Ryan M.
Martin, Freezing the Net: Rejecting a One-Size-Fits-All Standardfor Unmasking
Anonymous Internet Speakers in Defamation Lawsuits, 75 U. CIN. L. REV. 1217,
1226-37 (2007); Mazzotta, supra note 36, at 847-48; Michael S. Vogel,
Unmasking "JohnDoe" Defendants: The Case Against Excessive Hand-Wringing
over Legal Standards, 83 OR. L. REV. 795, 802-15 (2004).
43. Compare Mazzotta, supra note 36, at 863 ("The second important
component of the balancing prong is consideration of the speaker's First

576

WAKE FOREST LAWREVIEW

[Vol. 49

Courts might valuably draw from other disclosure contests to
view the choice of a tipping point not as an end in itself but as a
means to the end of assessing motive and balancing. 44 For example,
courts might choose the tipping point between protecting anonymity
and ordering disclosure in part to screen for impermissible
government motive. As a threshold matter, courts might be slower
to suspect government motive when the government is not the party
seeking the disclosure, as is usually the case in the online
unmasking context. As we have seen, legislatures and government
agencies in other settings generally seek to require disclosure to
inform listener decision making4 5 or to achieve other goals. 46 In the
online unmasking context, in contrast, private-party plaintiffs
generally seek state action in the form of a court order requiring
disclosure of an anonymous speaker's identity to enable
accountability for that speaker's allegedly illegal and unprotected
speech. 47 As Nathan Oman and Jason Solomon have urged in

Amendment right to remain anonymous. Some courts have rejected this
consideration as superfluous or an extra burden on plaintiffs. But explicit
consideration of the speaker's right to anonymity is important because
unmasking requests arise in a wide variety of contexts and under many
different causes of action, including defamation, trespass to chattel, trademark,
and trade secret violations."), with Vogel, supra note 42, at 808 ("The fourth
Dendrite factor is even more troubling. In effect, the court acknowledges that,
even if plaintiff has alleged a viable legal claim against the defendant-and
supported that claim with admissible evidence-the court may still exercise
discretion to stop the case in its tracks, at least to the extent that the 'strength
of the prima facie case' is given less weight than 'the defendant's First
Amendment right of anonymous free speech."' (quoting Dendrite Int'l, Inc., 775
A.2d at 760-61)), and Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky, Anonymity in Cyberspace: What
Can We Learn from John Doe?, 50 B.C. L. REV. 1373, 1380 (2009) ("Arguably, a
separate balancing test is unnecessary because a balancing of interests is built
into the prima facie evidence standard. Under the prima facie evidence
standard, the defendant's right to speak anonymously outweighs the plaintiffs
right to pursue a libel action unless and until the plaintiff presents evidence
that the libel claim is viable; once this burden is met, the balance tips in favor
of allowing plaintiff to pursue a claim for vindication of her reputation. An
explicit balancing test serves only to tilt the scales further toward the
protection of anonymous speech because presumably it allows even a viable
defamation claim to be dismissed on the ground that it is not strong enough to
outweigh defendant's First Amendment interests.").
44. Kendrick explains that "disclosure law should reflect a categorical
prohibition on compelled disclosure with the purpose of penalizing or deterring
protected expression," and "other compelled disclosures should be analyzed for
their effects on expression, which will inevitably involve balancing interests."
Kendrick, supra note 5, at 596.
45. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 370 (2010).
46. Doe v. Reed, 130 S. Ct. 2811, 2819 (2010).
47. See, e.g., In re Anonymous Online Speakers, 661 F.3d 1168, 1171 (9th
Cir. 2011) (seeking disclosure of the speaker's identity in action for tortious
interference with existing contracts and advantageous business relations); Doe I
v. Individuals, 561 F. Supp. 2d 249, 252 (D. Conn. 2008) (seeking disclosure of
the speaker's identity in action for libel, invasion of privacy, and emotional
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another setting, this difference may be significant for First
Amendment purposes: "[T]he Court should pay more attention to
the identity of the plaintiff and the way that the litigation is being
used. There is a difference between a government official seeking to
seeking redress for a wrong
quash criticism and a private individual
48
in which he was uniquely victimized."
Impermissible government motive is less likely a concern when
a nongovernmental plaintiff seeks to unmask an anonymous
defendant. In contrast, concerns about motive might be more acute
if the plaintiff herself is a public official who seeks to unmask an
anonymous critic-thus suggesting a more demanding evidentiary
standard of the plaintiff. In other words, the stronger the public
official plaintiffs showing that the anonymous defendant's speech
was illegal, the less basis for suspecting the plaintiffs disclosure
effort is motivated by a desire to squelch protected expression.
Consider, for example, Doe v. Cahill, which involved a defamation
claim by an elected town council member against an anonymous
online speaker for allegedly defamatory blog postings critical of the
official. 49 There, the Delaware Supreme Court chose the most
in part because of the
demanding available evidentiary standard,
50
plaintiffs status as a public official.
Similarly, we might also choose among available tipping points
the goals of balancing analysis, recognizing-as we have
achieve
to
seen in other disclosure contexts-that disclosures may vary in their
deterrent effects on protected speech. Note that the various tipping
point tests currently in play in the unmasking context are not true
balancing tests because they generally consider only one side of the
scale,5 1 assessing only the varying strength of the plaintiffs private
distress); Doe v. Cahill, 884 A.2d 451, 454 (Del. 2005) (seeking disclosure of the
speaker's identity in action for defamation).
48. See Nathan B. Oman & Jason M. Solomon, The Supreme Court's Theory
of Private Law, 62 DUKE L.J. 1109, 1114 (2013) ("[T]he Court should be more
attentive to the nature of state involvement in litigation and the importance of
the state's interest in providing private parties with a means of redress for
private injuries."); id. at 1163 ("As a mechanism for providing redress, private
law is not something that is easily replicated by other avenues, particularly in
the case of private-figure plaintiffs like Snyder. This inquiry about available
redress, though, has been entirely absent due to the Court's imputing
regulatory motive to the state. Closer attention to the state interest in redress,
we believe, would lead to greater efforts to allow some measure of redress, while
still protecting First Amendment values.").
49. Cahill, 884 A.2d at 454.
50. Id. ("We are concerned that setting the standard too low will chill
potential posters from exercising their First Amendment right to speak
anonymously. The possibility of losing anonymity in a future lawsuit could
intimidate anonymous posters into self-censoring their comments or simply not
commenting at all. A defamation plaintiff, particularly a public figure, obtains
a very important form of relief by unmasking the identity of his anonymous
critics.").
51. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
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law enforcement interests to be achieved by the disclosure without
any explicit attention to disclosures' potential for chilling protected
speech on the other side. 52 A few courts have responded to this gap
by requiring the plaintiff to survive a separate balancing analysis
53
even after making the requisite evidentiary showing.
But courts might instead draw from other disclosure contests to
choose the appropriate tipping point based on their assessment of
the disclosure's potential chilling effects, which may turn in great
part on the nature of the contested speech. 54 In other words, the
greater the disclosure's potential for chilling protected speech, the
tougher the evidentiary showing that courts should require of the
plaintiff to show that her private law enforcement interests
outweigh such expressive costs. To this end, a defendant who is on
notice of a disclosure petition and has the opportunity to oppose it
may offer circumstance-specific evidence as to the disclosure's
potential for chilling. 55 But even in those cases where the plaintiff
was unable to notify the anonymous defendant, courts might use the
nature of the contested speech as a proxy for the disclosure's chilling
potential. In other words, the more courts are concerned about
chilling-and their concern often varies with the nature of the
speech at issue 56-the more they should demand of the plaintiff
before concluding that the benefits of disclosure outweigh their
expressive costs.

52.

See Ho, supra note 6, at 421 ("Although private activity in response to

disclosure can in some contexts effectively chill speech, this is certainly not the
case in all or even most instances."); Monica Youn, The Chilling Effect and the
Problem of Private Action, 66 VAND. L. REV. 1473, 1476 (2013) (urging courts to
take care to distinguish-for constitutional purposes-chilling effects created by
private action rather than directly by government action); id. at 1479-80 ("[I]n
private chill cases, one cannot safely assume that overprotecting a [speaker's]
First Amendment interests will enhance public discourse or other First
Amendment values. Instead, overprotection may come at the expense of a third
party's responsive speech or other legal activities.").
53. See Dendrite Int'l, Inc. v. Doe, 775 A.2d 756, 760-61 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 2001).
54. Kendrick, supra note 5, at 579-80 ('"The effects-and-balancing approach
articulated in NAACP v. Alabama has become the primary standard for
violations of associational rights, including most compelled disclosures. A court
first asks the extent to which the challenged state action burdens expressive
association. In disclosure cases, this burden generally takes the form of a
deterrent effect on association. Establishing a constitutionally significant
deterrent effect requires a showing of credible threats of reprisal, usually
predicated on evidence of past reprisals. If a deterrent effect is constitutionally
significant, then it must be balanced against the interests furthered by the
challenged regulation.").
55. See Doe v. Reed, 130 S. Ct. 2811, 2820 (2010) (explaining that parties
can avoid disclosure if they show that disclosure will subject them to threats or
harassment); Cahill,884 A.2d at 460-61.
56. See Reed, 130 S.Ct. at 2819; Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 370
(2010).
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For example, courts might generally assess the accountability
benefits of disclosure as outweighing its expressive costs to a
commercial speaker, as commercial speakers are relatively unlikely
to be chilled. Consider, for example, anonymous online commercial
speech alleged to infringe copyrights or trademarks 57: unmasking
such speakers not only can vindicate significant private law
interests but also often threatens little danger of chilling low-value
commercial speech.
Courts considering disclosure petitions or
unmasking subpoenas in such cases may thus choose to impose less
58
demanding evidentiary standards on the plaintiff.

Similarly, a plaintiffs unmasking interest should be more likely
to survive a balancing analysis when the anonymous speaker
addresses a matter of private, rather than public, concern. The
Court has repeatedly emphasized that speech concerning public
affairs "occupies the highest rung on the hierarchy of First
Amendment values and is entitled to special protection." 59 In
contrast, when "matters of purely private significance are at issue,
First Amendment protections are often less rigorous.
That is
because restricting speech on purely private matters does not
implicate the same constitutional concerns as limiting speech on

57. E.g., Sony Music Entm't Co. v. Does 1-40, 326 F. Supp. 2d 556, 558
(S.D.N.Y. 2004) (copyright infringement suit where anonymous defendants
were alleged to have illegally downloaded and distributed copyrighted
material); Columbia Ins. Co. v. Seescandy.com, 185 F.R.D. 573, 578, 580 (N.D.
Cal. 1999) (trademark infringement with evidence of actual confusion).
58. For examples of decisions in which courts required a less demanding
evidentiary showing from the plaintiff seeking disclosure in the context of
online commercial speech, see In re Anonymous Online Speakers, 661 F.3d 1168,
1173 (9th Cir. 2011) (distinguishing standards appropriately applied to political
as opposed to commercial speech, given different levels of First Amendment
protection); Lefkoe v. Jos. A. Bank Clothiers, Inc., 577 F.3d 240, 248-49 (4th
Cir. 2009) ("Because the Doe Client's letter was commercial speech, any First
Amendment right to speak anonymously 'enjoys a limited measure of
protection, commensurate with its subordinate position in the scale of First
Amendment values, and is subject to modes of regulation that might be
impermissible in the realm of noncommercial expression.' We thus conclude
that the Doe Client's claimed First Amendment right to anonymity is subject to
a substantial government interest in disclosure so long as disclosure advances
that interest and goes no further than reasonably necessary." (citations
omitted) (quoting Bd. of Trs. of the State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 477
(1989)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
59. Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1215 (2011) (quoting Connick v.
Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 145 (1938)) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also id.
("Whether the First Amendment prohibits holding Westboro liable for its speech
in this case turns largely on whether that speech is of public or private concern,
as determined by all the circumstances of the case ....
The First Amendment
reflects 'a profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public
issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open.' That is because 'speech
concerning public affairs is more than self-expression; it is the essence of selfgovernment."') (quoting N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964);
Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74-75 (1964)).
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matters of public interest."60 Consider, for example, Doe I v.
Individuals,61 which involved defamation and tort claims brought by
two female law students against anonymous individuals who posted
allegedly defamatory, threatening, and harassing claims on a law
school admissions website about the plaintiffs' purported sex lives,
62
medical histories, substance abuse, criminal histories, and more.
There the plaintiffs' private law enforcement interests were quite
high, as they sought to protect their reputations and their
professional futures as well as their emotional and physical
security. 63 In contrast, the First Amendment value of-and thus
concerns about chilling-the contested speech on such matters not of
public concern was comparatively low. 64 Here too courts may
appropriately impose a less demanding evidentiary standard on the
plaintiff than in cases where the contested speech involves a matter
65
of public concern.
To be sure, distinguishing speech as public or private, or
commercial or noncommercial in nature is often no easy task.66 My
point here is simply that rather than mechanically choosing and
applying among several available tipping points as ends in
themselves, courts should more thoughtfully pick and apply tipping
points to screen for impermissible government motive and balance
the benefits of disclosure against its potential chilling effects on
67
protected expression.

60. Id. at 1215; see also id. at 1215-16 (explaining that not all speech is of
equal First Amendment value, and that the regulation of speech on matters of
private concern poses substantially less danger to key First Amendment
values).
61. 561 F. Supp. 2d 249 (D. Conn. 2008).

62. Id. at 251, 255-56 (applying intermediate evidentiary standard
between good faith/motion to dismiss and summary judgment).
63. Danielle K. Citron, Cyber Civil Rights, 89 B.U. L. REV. 61, 77, 80 (2009).
64. Lidsky, supra note 43, at 1389 (arguing that because the plaintiffs were
targeted "not because they ran a business, held public office, or sought to
influence public affairs but simply because of gender, intelligence and
appearance," disclosing the anonymous speakers posed "relatively little danger
of silencing discussion on matters of public concern").
65. Note too that choosing the evidentiary standard based on the
disclosure's potential chilling effect eliminates the need for an additional (and
potentially confusing or superfluous) balancing analysis. See supra notes 41, 43
and accompanying text.
66. See Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1211 (2011); City of San Diego,
Cal. v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77, 80-81 (2004); Riley v. Nat'l Fed. of the Blind of N.C.,
487 U.S. 781, 795-96 (1988).
67. Other commentators have at various times and for various reasons also
suggested that courts' choice of standard should turn in part on the character of
the contested speech, the status of the plaintiff, or both. See, e.g., Clay Calvert
et al., supra note 42, at 3-5; Ryan M. Martin, supra note 42, at 1238-39. Here I
explain that approach as appropriately tracking assessments of motive and
balancing undertaken by courts in other disclosure contexts.
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CONCLUSION

Courts confronted with online unmasking challenges might
helpfully draw from other disclosure contexts to choose a tipping
point that leaves them confident both that the disclosure effort is
appropriately motivated by an interest in vindicating plaintiffs'
private law interests rather than in censoring or targeting
vulnerable speakers and also that such disclosures' accountability
gains outweigh their potential chilling effects. More specifically,
courts might be more suspicious of disclosure efforts sought by a
government official and correspondingly impose a tougher tipping
point on that plaintiff before requiring disclosure of the defendant's
identity. Furthermore, courts might choose the appropriate tipping
point based on their assessment of the disclosure's potential chilling
effects, which may turn in great part on the nature of the contested
speech-for example, as commercial or noncommercial, or of public
or private concern.

